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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of a recent three-part series by the New York Times,1 arbitration is 
now back in the eye of the storm.  The leading critique of arbitration, especially in 
the consumer and employment space, is that it is unjust both in the sense that it does 
not comport with basic notions of procedural fairness and/or because it cannot be 
expected to produce outcomes we would consider substantively just.  For example, 
procedure in arbitration is dictated largely by contract rather than by mandatory 
rules that have been vetted by public bodies entrusted with safeguarding procedural 
values.2  Arbitrators are not bound by the rules of evidence.3  There is no substantive 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
 1. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Jus-
tice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-
everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In 
Arbitration, a “Privatization of the Justice System,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-sys-
tem.html?_r=0; Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture is the 
Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-
religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html. 
 2. E.g., Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005). 
 3. E.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956) (rejecting the idea that 
arbitration is an adequate substitute for a judicial trial in part because arbitrators are not bound by the 
rules of evidence). 
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merits review.4  These and other observations have led a growing chorus of critics 
to declare that arbitration is “an inferior system of justice, structured without due 
process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law;”5 a “deeply 
unfair end-run around the public courts and our civil justice system;”6 little more 
than an instrument of corporate “self-deregulation”7 that “subvert[s] our system of 
justice as we have come to know it.”8 
Rather than meet this objection head-on, defenders of arbitration are typically 
quick to concede that arbitration is likely to be more unjust or unfair than our rule-
bound, public system of justice.9  The thrust of their response is therefore to focus 
on arbitration’s other virtues.  For example, they claim that, as compared with liti-
gation, arbitration makes many more choices available to disputants and gives them 
broad freedom to design a disputing process tailored to their particular needs.10  
They also argue that arbitration is generally faster, cheaper, and more efficient than 
its judicial counterpart.11  In these ways, they help constitute arbitration’s identity 
primarily through values such as party autonomy and process efficiency rather than 
in terms of substantive or procedural justice. 
I want to suggest that this almost reflexive embrace of autonomy and efficiency 
at the expense of justice substantially short-changes arbitration’s legacy as well as 
arbitration’s future potential to provide a robust alternative to adjudication in public 
                                                          
 4. Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Ar-
bitration, 84 N.C. L. REV. 123, 140 (2005) (noting in the securities arbitration context that “there is no 
meaningful judicial oversight to ensure that arbitrators are applying the law”); Charles L. Knapp, Taking 
Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 782–83 (2002) 
(“[A]rbitrators in most cases are not bound to follow the law, nor are their decisions appealable to a court 
of law for any but the most egregious of defects.”); Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Pri-
vatization of the Justice System,” supra note 1 (“[U]nlike the outcomes in civil court, arbitrators’ rulings 
are nearly impossible to appeal.”). 
 5. Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 6. John O’Donnell et al., The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers, 
PUBLIC CITIZEN 5 (Sept. 2007), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf. 
 7. Paul D. Carrington, Self-Deregulation, the National Policy of the Supreme Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 259, 
281–86, 288 (2003). 
 8. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 941 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring), 
vacated sub nom. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995). 
 9. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, At the Crossroads of Legitimacy and Arbitral Autonomy, 16 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 258 (2005) (explaining the rise of arbitration in terms of a need for “workable 
dispute resolution” rather than “the integrity of legal principles and . . . the fairness and legitimacy borne 
of rigorous due process”). 
 10. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 51 (2010); 
Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 56, 
92 (2014). 
 11. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in 
Arbitration, in HOW ADR WORKS 915, 926 (Norman Brand ed., 2002) (“The greatest strength of arbi-
tration is that the average person can afford it.”).  A good example here is Hall Street Associates v. Mattel 
where the Court defended its conclusion that parties could not contract for substantive merits review 
under the FAA not because an added tier of review would open up more avenues for procedural wran-
gling and thus a greater risk that cases would be resolved without due regard for the merits, but rather 
because it would make arbitration more expensive, inefficient, and complex.  Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, 
552 U.S. 576 (2008).  The Court reasoned that the FAA’s barebones vacatur provisions signified 
a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s 
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway. Any other reading opens the door to the full-
bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can “rende[r] informal arbitration merely a prelude to a 
more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process. . . .” 
Id. at 588. 
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courts.  About the time the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)12 was passed in 1925, 
arbitration’s virtues were not limited to affording more opportunities for choice or 
providing a faster and cheaper forum; they also included the idea that arbitral pro-
cedure was qualitatively superior to judicial procedure circa 1925, which in turn 
meant that the arbitral forum promised a more just resolution of disputes on their 
merits.13  As the American Judicature Society put it in 1926, arbitration delivered 
“real justice, as against [the] mere theoretical justice” promised by courts.14  In con-
temporary discourse about arbitration—particularly in the mandatory binding arbi-
tration area—we have lost this justice-based conception of arbitration. 
Reconstituting our conception of arbitration to include a commitment to justice 
will become increasingly important as arbitration continues to evolve into some-
thing of a de facto surrogate for litigation.15  This is especially true in the case of 
disputes arising out of mass-contracting relationships, where the quality of consent 
to arbitration procedures is often placed in doubt.  As the recent New York Times 
trilogy suggests, the debate over arbitration in these cases will increasingly require 
arbitration supporters to provide a more sophisticated and nuanced account of how 
a system of arbitration can address concerns about procedural fairness and legiti-
macy more so than freedom of choice or the bottom line. 
II.   FORMALISM V. INFORMALISM 
One important reason why arbitration is constructed in terms of autonomy and 
efficiency far more than justice has to do with arbitration’s informalism.16  Among 
critics of arbitration there is a common perception that informal systems are less 
capable than formal ones at guaranteeing justice,17 especially for the party with 
fewer resources.18 
There is certainly some truth to these criticisms.  But it also bears noting that, 
to contemporary minds at least, it is much easier to associate informalism with law-
lessness than with justice.  Informalism evokes our worst fears of the Star Chamber, 
kangaroo courts, and unbridled discretion.  It suggests a lack of consistency and 
equal treatment, results skewed by the unequal resources or sophistication of the 
parties,19 and a questionable commitment to the rule of law.20  By contrast, a formal 
system appears to us more effective at disciplining and constraining behavior. 
                                                          
 12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). 
 13. Hiro N. Aragaki, The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1939, 
1973–86 (2014). 
 14. Model Arbitration Statute Offered, 10 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 122, 123 (1926). 
 15. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997). 
 16. Another reason is the perceived lack of true assent to boilerplate arbitration clauses in adhesive 
settings.  See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 82–98 (2013); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Su-
preme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637, 675–76 (1996). 
 17. E.g., JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS 
145 (1983). 
 18. E.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1394–96. 
 19. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 113–26 (2011). 
 20. See David M. Trubek, Turning Away from Law? 82 MICH. L. REV. 824, 825 (1984) (book review). 
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As a result, to critics and supporters of arbitration alike, informality and justice 
come to be seen as part of a zero sum game: The more of one the less of the other.21  
This is suggested in remarks by the Court that when parties choose arbitration, they 
“forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the 
benefits of private dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and 
the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes”22—as if 
arbitration can either be a formal system focused on justice or an informal system 
focused on securing other benefits such as freedom of contract or efficiency, but not 
both.23  It also underlies the claim by critics that informality and justice are funda-
mentally irreconcilable.24  On this view, the best that can be said about a system that 
lacks formal evidentiary and procedural rules is that it is “speedy, inexpensive, and 
flexible.”25  Rather than settling disputes on their proper merits based on reasoned 
arguments, in other words, informality inevitably allows things to devolve into a 
“wide-ranging, probing, ‘therapeutic’”—and therefore unprincipled—inquiry.26  
The idea that an informal system can be committed to justice as much as (or more 
than) it is committed to other private ordering values appears almost beyond con-
templation. 
As a result, arbitration’s selling points are constructed almost exclusively in 
terms of concepts such as autonomy or efficiency.  For example, the Court has em-
phasized that “[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion, 
and parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see 
fit.”27  It has also described “arbitration’s essential virtue” in terms of “resolving 
disputes straightaway.”28  Commentators on both sides of the aisle, too, focus on 
the twin virtues of autonomy and efficiency, framing arbitration’s chief advantages 
                                                          
 21. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 507, 555 (2011) (declaring that contract procedure “reflect[s] market rather than constitutional 
imperatives,” without considering that it might reflect both). 
 22. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 23. Other examples abound.  See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 (1974) 
(“[I]t is the informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and 
expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less 
appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts.”); Wilko v. Swan, 346 
U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (reasoning that arbitration’s primary advantage of “secur[ing] prompt, economical 
and adequate” decisions made it correspondingly unsuited to decide weighty and complicated issues 
under the federal securities laws), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 
U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
 24. Richard Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: 
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 267, 291–94 (Richard Abel, ed. 1982); Delgado et al., supra note 18, at 
1391–97; Laura Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998, 1009–14, 1020 (1979). 
 25. Delgado et al., supra note 18, at 1374. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989).  
This rationale is cited in one form or another in many of the Court’s recent decisions.  See, e.g., Am. 
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 U.S. 333, 344, 359 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 682; EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 
279, 293–94 (2002). 
 28. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 345 (describing the “encouragement of efficient and speedy dispute res-
olution” as one of the goals of the FAA); Hall St. Assocs., LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 
(2008); accord Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrys-
ler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985)) (“A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to 
achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results.’”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983) (“Congress’ clear intent [in enacting the FAA was] to move the 
parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.”). 
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over litigation almost exclusively in terms of freedom of choice or cost and time 
savings.29 
As a philosophical matter, however, there is no necessary connection between 
informalism and private ordering on the one hand, and formalism and justice on the 
other.  Virtually everything that has been said about informalism can also be said 
about formalism.  To law and economics scholars, for instance, formalism—not 
informalism—is the most reliable means of promoting efficiency.  Clear and trans-
parent rules better allocate baseline legal entitlements and better guide future be-
havior.30  Formal rules can also help respect the rights of the individual and in this 
sense further the value of personal autonomy.  This animates Amalia Kessler’s ex-
planation for why European conciliation courts never took hold on this side of the 
Atlantic: They were regarded as a vestige of an older feudal order that emphasized 
“deference to social superiors[] rather than individual autonomy.”31  American in-
dividualism lent itself more readily to an embrace of “formal, adversarial adjudica-
tion,” which Kessler further argues was “integrally linked to the new nation’s 
unique capacity to promote both freedom and free enterprise.”32 
By the same token, a formal system is not immune to injustice.  As Morton 
Horwitz has argued, although the rule of law “undoubtedly restrains power . . . . it 
also prevents power’s benevolent exercise.  It creates formal equality—a not incon-
siderable virtue—but it promotes substantive inequality by creating a consciousness 
                                                          
 29. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitra-
tion Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 878 (2008) (re-
porting that companies express a preference for arbitration because it “takes less time and costs less than 
litigation” and “offers ‘a quick, cheap, and easy dispute resolution mechanism’ that is ‘more efficient’”) 
(footnotes omitted) (citation omitted); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbi-
tration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 
56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 340 (2007) (observing that “the bulk of authority seems to agree that arbitration 
is a more efficient dispute resolution procedure than litigation”); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims 
and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3070–71 (2015) (identifying “streamlined, 
efficient proceedings” and “freedom of contract” as the two principal values expressed in the Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence and arguing that after American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the latter 
has completely eclipsed the former); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 432 (1986) (arguing that proponents of ar-
bitration and ADR tend to emphasize efficiency gains, such as through docket clearing); Sternlight, su-
pra note 16, at 677–78 (observing that supporters of arbitration tend to claim that it is faster and cheaper 
than litigation); Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 4 (“Conventional wisdom suggests that businesses choose 
binding arbitration mainly because it is perceived to be different from litigation.  Parties look for some 
or all of the following: cost savings, shorter resolution times, a more satisfactory process, expert decision 
makers, privacy and confidentiality, and relative finality.”) (footnote omitted). 
 30. Randall P. Bezanson, The Myths of Formalism: An Essay on Our Faith That Formalism Yields 
Fairness and Effectiveness in Public Administration, 69 IOWA L. REV. 957, 968 (1984) (“Efficiency and 
centralization are major byproducts of formalism.”).  See generally Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All 
Er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530 (1999) (arguing that, unlike mo-
rality, law’s formalism promotes efficiency). 
 31. Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a Euro-
pean Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423, 428 (2009). 
 32. Id. at 430.  Stephen Subrin makes a similar point when he argues that David Dudley Field’s pro-
posed procedural reforms in the mid-nineteenth century reflected Field’s own twin commitment to for-
mal law (as opposed to free-floating equity) and “[i]ndividual rights, state rights, limited government, 
and laissez faire economics . . . .”  Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 934 (1987). 
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that radically separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from out-
comes.”33  A rule-bound system can enable those who wish to avoid complying with 
the rule to hide behind a technical adherence to the letter of the rule—something 
that is considerably more difficult to accomplish in informal systems.  As Cass Sun-
stein explains, “rules have clear edges, they allow people to ‘evade’ them by engag-
ing in conduct that is technically exempted but that creates the same or analogous 
harms.”34  Unlike standards, whose vagueness can have the opposite effect of 
chilling bad or questionable behavior, rules “allow the proverbial ‘bad man’ to 
‘walk the line,’ that is, to take conscious advantage of underinclusion to perpetrate 
fraud with impunity.”35 
The equity tradition developed in direct response to these perils of formalism.36  
As a system of ex ante rules, the common law tolerated injustices in particular cases 
for the sake of predictability and consistency.  The classic example is that of the 
debtor who pays off a bond but neglects to have it cancelled.  Because early English 
common law treated the seal as proof positive of a debt, the debtor in this case would 
have had no defense at law were an unscrupulous creditor later to sue on the same 
instrument.37  By contrast, the debtor could obtain relief from the Chancellor sitting 
in equity, who—much like modern-day arbitrators—were not bound by the law and 
could use their discretion to effectuate substantive justice between the parties.  Eq-
uity’s informalism, in other words, was precisely what enabled it to serve as an 
important “safety valve to deal with the problem of opportunism that arises where 
the simple ex ante structures of the common law invite efforts at manipulation by 
the sophisticated and unscrupulous.”38  Rather than liberty or utility, therefore, the 
informal system of equity is better understood as focused on justice.39  And not just 
“rustic justice,” either.  Historian John Baker goes as far as to claim that “the chan-
cellor’s justice was seen as something superior to the less flexible justice of the two 
benches.”40  Something similar might be said about the unconscionability defense 
                                                          
 33. Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 
(1977). 
 34. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 995 (1995). 
 35. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 
1696 (1976); see also Horwitz, supra note 33, at 566 (“By promoting procedural justice [the rules of 
law] enable[] the shrewd, the calculating, and the wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own ad-
vantage.”). 
 36. As Lord Ellesmere explained, “[t]he Cause why there is a Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are 
so divers and infinite, That it is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every 
particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances.”  The Earl of Oxford’s Case, [1615] 21 Eng. Rep. 
485 (Ch.) 486. 
 37. CHRISTOPHER SAINT GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 37–38 (William Muchall ed. 1874) (1518) 
(Dialogue I, chap. 12). 
 38. Henry E. Smith, The Equitable Dimension of Contract, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 903 (2012) 
(emphasis added); accord JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 17 (1838) (observing that equity “qualifies, moderates, 
and reforms the rigor, hardness, and edge of the law . . . and defends the law from crafty evasions, 
delusions, and mere subtilties, invented and contrived to evade and elude the common law . . . .”). 
 39. In Justice Story’s view, the “office of Equity [was] to protect and support the common law from 
shifts and contrivances against the justice of the law.  Equity, therefore, does not destroy the law, nor 
create it, but assists it.”  STORY, supra note 38, at § 17; see also Zechariah Chafee, Foreword to 
SELECTED ESSAYS ON EQUITY, at iii (Edward D. Re ed., 1955) (describing equity as “a way of looking 
at the administration of justice” and as a response to “the production of injustice by the very agencies 
which have been established to do justice”). 
 40. JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 90 (2d. ed., 1979) (em-
phasis added). 
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or even the Warren Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.41  The potential for 
abuses of discretion notwithstanding, both have come to be widely regarded as im-
portant bulwarks of justice—not just despite the fact that they make ex post judicial 
policing possible but because of it. 
III.   ARBITRATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
My goal in Part II was to suggest that as theoretical matter, formalism has no 
greater purchase on justice than informalism.  In this Part, I provide historical evi-
dence to back this up.  I show that, around the time that modern arbitration law 
reform (including the FAA) was being debated in legislatures, bar associations, and 
the popular press, arbitration’s informalism was precisely what made it appear to 
be a forum committed to the just and fair adjudication of disputes on their merits. 
A. What if Less is More? Constructions of Arbitration and Litigation 
Circa 1925 
In the decades leading up to the enactment of the FAA, the courts were widely 
perceived as unable to deliver substantial justice.  Crippling delays and mounting 
backlogs made it difficult for claims to be adjudicated on their merits in a timely 
fashion.42  Even when they were, the resulting decision according to the law often 
did not reflect the layperson’s sense of what was right.43 
Leading voices of reform in this era such as Roscoe Pound argued that these 
problems were traceable more than anything else to the excessive formalism of the 
procedural law.  In an era preceding the Rules Enabling Act,44 judicial procedure 
was largely a creature of statute rather than court rule.  Procedural codes of the day 
were notoriously complex and voluminous—some, like New York’s infamous 
                                                          
 41. Cf. Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 613 (1999) (describing the 
Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence as capable of authoritatively settling moral con-
flicts even though it is not based on determinate rules). 
 42. MOORFIELD STOREY, THE REFORM OF LEGAL PROCEDURE 108–9 (1912) (reporting that in 1909, 
7,274 cases awaited trial in Pittsburg courts, which could try on average only 783 cases per year); Wesley 
A. Sturges, Some Common Law Rules and Arbitration, in DANIEL BLOOMFIELD, SELECTED ARTICLES 
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 158 (Daniel Bloomfield ed., 1927) (summarizing newspaper reports 
that during the ten month period ending April 30, 1925, some 114,000 cases were disposed of by the 
federal courts while 126,000 more were added); John Edson Brady, The Arbitration of Commercial Dis-
putes, 6 BUS. L.J. 421, 421 (1925) (“[I]f no new cases were added to the calendar it would take about 
two years to dispose of the existing [backlog] . . . .”); Moses H. Grossman, The Need of Arbitration to 
Relieve the Congestion in the Courts, 10 ACAD. POL. SCI. OF N.Y.C. 211, 211 (1923) (reporting increase 
of 18,000 cases pending in New York county courts from 1917–1923 and that trial courts could only 
process about 8,000–9,000 of them in a given year). 
 43. Henry W. Jessup, The Simplification of the Machinery of Justice with a View to Its Greater Effi-
ciency: Report to the Phi Delta Phi Club of New York City by Its Committee of Nine, in JUSTICE 
THROUGH SIMPLIFIED LEGAL PROCEDURE, 73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 16–17 (Carl 
Kelsey & Henry W. Jessup eds., 1917); William L. Ransom, The Organization of the Courts for the 
Better Administration of Justice, 2 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 265 (1917); Thomas W. Shelton, Greater Effi-
cacy of the Trial of Civil Cases, 33 COM. L. LEAGUE J. 661, 661 (1928). 
 44. Pub. L. No. 73–415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). 
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Throop Code, contained upwards of three thousand sections.45  This elaborate sys-
tem of statutory procedure both reflected and reinforced a deep distrust of judicial 
discretion to police fairness in particular cases.  For example, if a judge sought to 
prevent a clear “miscarriage of justice occurring in his sight” by “depart[ing] in the 
least from the rigid, statutory regimen,” inevitably one party would appeal and the 
judgment would be reversed on technical grounds.46  The net result was that lawyers 
and eventually even judges came to lose sight of the purpose of procedural rules, 
which was merely to facilitate the administration of justice rather than to eclipse it.  
This caused Pound to lament that, instead of stopping to ask what “substantive law 
and justice” require in a particular case, judges and lawyers became myopically 
focused on ensuring that the “the rules of the game been carried out strictly.”47 
The rigidity of procedure also facilitated a game-like or “sporting” approach to 
litigation.48  Lawyers bent on winning would justify results that had nothing to do 
with the merits of the case on the ground that they were simply standing on their 
rights.  Shelton made this point in a way that recalls Horwitz’s and Sunstein’s warn-
ings that formalism, far from constraining bad behavior, can actually facilitate it.49  
He argued that a system of statutory procedure enabled lawyers to 
place[] insurmountable barriers in the path of the court in its journey to the 
goal established and set up by justice and the merits of the cause . . . [by 
arguing that] he is merely seeking the enforcement of the [procedural] stat-
utes and asking that government be conducted in the manner that the leg-
islative branch has seen fit to enact and to provide.50 
In sharp contrast to how we might see it today, therefore, formalism in proce-
dure was viewed as enabling the pursuit of individual self-interest (read: autonomy) 
as much as and perhaps even more so than of truth or justice.51  This was consistent 
with the fact that—David Dudley Field’s earlier attempt at merging law and equity 
notwithstanding—most procedural codes of the day were still heavily inspired by 
common law procedure.52  For as Pound explained, the common law has tradition-
ally emphasized individual rights—that is, the “liberty of each limited only by the 
like liberties of all”—over the public good.53  No wonder, therefore, that 
                                                          
 45. Subrin, supra note 32, at 940 (noting that the New York Code of Civil Procedure had “3441 pro-
visions by 1897”).  Compare this with the 86 Rules in today’s Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 1–86 (2015). 
 46. THOMAS W. SHELTON, SPIRIT OF THE COURTS 93 (1918). 
 47. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 ANN. 
REP. A.B.A. 395, 406 (1906). 
 48. Pound famously referred to this as the “sporting theory of justice.”  Roscoe Pound, Some Princi-
ples of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 391 (1910). 
 49. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 50. SHELTON, SPIRIT OF THE COURTS, supra note 46, at xxvii. 
 51. Jessup, supra note 43, at 21 (quoting Elihu Root’s 1916 presidential address to the American Bar 
Association); Edward F. Sherman, Dean Pound’s Dissatisfaction with the “Sporting Theory of Justice”: 
Where Are We a Hundred Years Later?, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 983, 984–85 (2007). 
 52. See Subrin, supra note 32, at 931–39 (providing an excellent discussion of how this was the case). 
 53. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 339, 345–47 
(1905). 
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the common-law theory of litigation is that of a fair fist fight, according to 
the canons of the manly art, with a court to see fair play and prevent inter-
ference.  Americans . . . .  strive in every way to restrain the trial judge and 
to insure the individual litigants a fair fight, unhampered by mere consid-
erations of justice.54 
The reform agenda that eventually led to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(and, much later, the Federal Rules of Evidence) was therefore organized around 
the principle that fewer rules of procedure would help produce more substantial 
justice.  In other words, “Less is More.”  As Charles Evans Hughes explained, “[i]t 
is manifest that the goal [of the Federal Rules] is a simplified practice which will 
strip procedure of unnecessary forms, technicalities and distinctions, and permit the 
advance of causes to the decision of their merits with a minimum of procedural 
encumbrances.”55 
It bears emphasizing that Hughes and others did not gesture toward informal-
ism on the ground that it would create more opportunities for party autonomy or 
process efficiency.  Instead, they did so because they believed it would help ensure 
that cases would be decided on their proper merits rather than get caught up in or 
disposed of by procedural formalities.  To take another example, because the right 
of appeal was much broader than it is today, it was not uncommon for cases to be 
retried three, four, five or more times,56 which all too often meant that litigants with 
limited resources were forced to compromise valid claims.57 When reformers such 
as William Howard Taft argued for limiting the scope of judicial review to one 
(rather than the existing two) appeals as of right,58 they did not do so on the basis 
that it would produce cost and time savings that would outweigh any loss in accu-
racy or fairness.  Instead, they argued that one right of appeal actually produced 
more accurate, fair results: 
In truth, there is nothing which is so detrimental to the interests of the poor 
man as the right which, if given to him, must also be given to the other and 
wealthier party.  It means generally two, three and four, and in some cases 
even five and six years of litigation.  Could any greater opportunity be put 
in the hands of wealthy persons or corporations to fight off just claims and 
to defeat . . . the legal rights of poor litigants, than to delay them in securing 
their just due for several years?  I think not.  The fact is that procedure 
                                                          
 54. Id. at 347.  This is consistent with Kessler’s explanation for why Americans rejected European 
conciliation courts for a more adversarial model of dispute resolution.  See supra notes 31–32 and ac-
companying text. 
 55. Address of Chief Justice Hughes, 21 A.B.A. J. 340, 341 (1935). 
 56. See George W. Alger, Treadmill Justice, ATL. MONTHLY, Nov. 1909, at 696, 698–700. 
 57. See Arthur John Keeffe et al., 86 or 1100, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 253, 258 (1946); H. H. Nordlinger, 
Law and Arbitration, 30 COM. L. LEAGUE J. 621, 622 (1925). 
 58. Prior to the current regime of certiorari review introduced by the Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. 
No. 68–415, 43 Stat. 936, litigants in federal court had a right to appeal both to the circuit courts and to 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  A similar situation prevailed at the time in state courts.  See generally Edson 
R. Sunderland, Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. REV. 126 (1926) (discussing system of double 
appeals in state courts). 
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which limits the right of appeal works in the end for the benefit of the poor 
litigant and puts him more on an equality with a wealthy opponent.59 
Against this background, arbitration’s informalism was, ironically, precisely 
what made it seem a superior alternative to judicial procedure circa 1925.60  Alt-
hough some state arbitration statutes provided for review of arbitral awards for legal 
error,61 arbitration was generally free of the complicated system of double appeals 
and interlocutory appeals, which sometimes led to wasteful retrials based on tech-
nical procedural defects that made little or no difference to the ultimate outcome.62  
Moreover, because the rules of evidence were relaxed, arbitrators could hear crucial 
testimony that would otherwise be excluded from a court of law based on the rules 
of hearsay or opinion testimony.63  Less time would be taken up debating the proper 
method for introducing the evidence and more time would actually be spent 
considering it.64  Witnesses could get to the heart of their grievances by telling their 
stories in a natural manner, “without continual interruption and badgering by coun-
sel and striking out of testimony.”65 
This led judges and lawyers writing during this period to observe that as com-
pared to litigation, arbitration “does away with . . . the technicalities of pleading, 
trifling exceptions relating to procedure, and rules of evidence . . . and gets down to 
the marrow of a controversy in a simple, speedy, and direct manner.”66  The U.S. 
Department of Commerce explained that, as compared with litigation, “[arbitration] 
                                                          
 59. William H. Taft, Delays and Defects in the Enforcement of Law in this Country, 187 N. AM. REV. 
851, 855 (1908); Edward J. McDermott, Delays and Reversals on Technical Grounds in Civil and Crim-
inal Trials, 7 PROC. AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 97, 102 (1910) (supporting proposals to restrict the right of 
appeal on the ground that doing so would “not prevent the attainment of substantial justice to the parties 
concerned and will not mar the standing of the profession”). 
 60. Special Committee, Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Attitude of the Legal Profession Toward 
Arbitration, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 42, at 201, 203 (“In 
large measure commercial arbitration is based upon procedural superiorities which that system has or is 
claimed to have over our established system for the administration of justice.”).  See Aragaki, supra note 
13, at 1962–2007 (providing more background). 
 61. See, e.g., ILL. REV. ST., ch. 10, § 11 (1927) (repealed 1961); WASH. COMP. ST. ANN. § 424–25 
(1922).  Compare IOWA CODE § 12699 (1927) (providing that, subject to the agreement of the parties, 
“all the rules prescribed by law in case of referees are applicable to arbitrators”) with id. § 11525 (“The 
trial by referee shall be conducted in the same manner as a trial by the court”) with id. § 11550(6) 
(providing that a referee’s report may be vacated if it is “not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is 
contrary to law”). 
 62. See, e.g., Alger, supra note 56, at 698–99; Keeffe et al., supra note 57, at 258; Pound, supra note 
47, at 413; Sunderland, supra note 58, at 135, 144–45. 
 63. See Charles A. Boston, Some Observations Upon the Report of the Committee of the Phi Delta 
Phi with Special Reference to the Typical Judicial Article for a Constitution, in JUSTICE THROUGH 
SIMPLIFIED LEGAL PROCEDURE, 73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.  SCI., 104, 105 (Carl Kelsey & 
Henry W. Jessup eds., 1917) (arguing that evidence rules are “so administered as often to exclude the 
very best attainable evidence of a fact, which is accepted as such evidence everywhere outside of a court 
room by reasonable men”); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 620 
(1908); W.F. Weiss, Arbitration, 36 J. ACCOUNTANCY 327, 329 (1923).  In such cases, the arbitrators 
would give the evidence the weight they deemed appropriate—something that judges at the time were 
powerless to do.  See John H. Wigmore, Qualities of Current Judicial Decisions, 9 ILL. L. REV. 529, 
537–40 (1914). 
 64. Wesley A. Sturges, Commercial Arbitration or Court Application of Common Law Rules of Mar-
keting?, 34 YALE L.J. 480, 486–89 (1925). 
 65. Nordlinger, supra note 57, at 625. 
 66. See Percy Werner, Voluntary Tribunals: A Democratic Ideal for the Adjudication of Private Dif-
ferences Which Give Rise To Civil Actions, 3 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 101, 107 (1919–1920). 
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affords a means for decision upon the merits . . . with less chance for the result to 
turn upon some technicality or some rule of which neither party had knowledge.”67  
Even Charles E. Clark, one of the chief architects of the Federal Rules, sometimes 
looked to arbitration and other informal tribunals such as workmen’s compensation 
boards as a model for reform.68 
To these and other commentators writing almost a century ago, arbitration’s 
informalism did not automatically signify what Paul Carrington calls “self-deregu-
lation.”69  To the contrary, it was perceived as promoting ethics and the rule of law 
in business because arbitrators, unencumbered by rigid substantive and procedural 
rules, were more effective at getting to the root of a dispute, thereby making it 
harder for businesses to shield unethical practices behind the letter of the law.70  A 
similar sentiment about the justice-enhancing quality of informal adjudication is 
reflected in a little known survey of business leaders conducted by the Special Com-
mittee on Arbitration of the New York City Bar Association sometime in 1927 or 
1928.71  One survey question asked how desirable it was that arbitrators were not 
bound by rules of law.  Of 65 respondents, 42 said this was positively desirable, 
only one said it was undesirable, and the remainder were indifferent.72  What’s in-
teresting is that those who thought it desirable did not defend informalism primarily 
on autonomy or efficiency grounds.  Instead, they claimed it helped arbitration 
reach better decisions on the merits than litigation.  Here are some examples of their 
comments: 
“It would seem that this liberal provision regarding rules of law is a desir-
able feature.  Often court decisions are upset not on the merit of the con-
troversy itself but on failure to conform to technical provisions of law 
which do not bear directly upon the merits of the case.”73 
“We are in favor of arbitration principally because of the fact that arbitra-
tors are not bound or limited by rules of law but are supposed to base their 
opinion on the equity involved rather than on technical legal points . . . .”74 
“The informality of hearings in commercial arbitration permits that sense 
of freedom to the contestants and witnesses that brings forth the true por-
trayal of the facts and circumstances regarding the matter in dispute.  It is 
impossible to secure this atmosphere before those of the legal profession 
                                                          
 67. L. E. WARFORD ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., TRADE ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES 98 (1923). 
 68. See Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J. 67, 71 (1927) (arguing that strict 
pleading rules might not be essential for ordinary litigation, considering that commercial arbitration tri-
bunals and workmen’s compensation boards dispensed with them). 
 69. Carrington, supra note 7, at 279–283. 
 70. See, e.g., CLARENCE F. BIRDSEYE, ARBITRATION AND BUSINESS ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE VARIOUS TYPES OF ARBITRATION AND THEIR RELATIONS TO 
BUSINESS ETHICS 113, 171 (1926); Report of the Special Committee on Arbitration, in YEARBOOK OF 
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 267, 273 (1925) [hereinafter Special Com-
mittee Report (1925)]. 
 71. See Annual Report of the Special Committee on Arbitration, in YEARBOOK OF THE ASSOCIATION 
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 294 (1928). 
 72. Id. at 312. 
 73. Id. at 312–13. 
 74. Id. at 312. 
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and where more often than not the witnesses or parties to the arbitration 
are confined to a ‘yes’ or ‘no.’”75 
These and other observations from the period express the idea that law and 
justice are not coterminous; it is possible, in other words, to reach just outcomes 
without positive law.76  As William Ransom, a former New York judge and later 
counsel to the New York Public Services Commission, explained, “[t]he admin-
istration of justice is, as we have seen, not necessarily justice according to law; 
unrivalled and perfect justice may conceivably be administered by a ruler governed 
only by his own discretion or by a tribunal which enforces only its own standards 
and views.”77 
This praise for informalism was not just limited to the commercial sphere, in 
which it is sometimes (erroneously) supposed that parties possess relatively equal 
bargaining power.  Arbitration was also viewed in this period as a way to enhance 
access to justice for the poor.78  For example, in his widely-circulated book on the 
subject, Reginald Heber Smith referred to arbitration and conciliation as the “first 
line of attack” against the “inequalities in the administration of justice” and de-
scribed how arbitration was used by legal aid societies as a solution to the “problem 
of denial of justice.”79  Tellingly, many leaders of the modern arbitration law reform 
movement such as Julius Henry Cohen and Frances Kellor were also actively in-
volved in Progressive causes.80 
B. Autonomy and Efficiency as a Means to Achieve Justice 
Here it could be retorted that my account of the FAA fails to consider the fact 
that the push for modern arbitration law reform in the early twentieth century was 
spearheaded largely by trade associations, chambers of commerce, and other mer-
cantile interests for whom privatization and bottom lines were paramount.  This 
emphasis in the historiography of the FAA on arbitration’s commercial roots, in 
turn, has helped solidify the association between arbitration’s informalism and val-
ues such as autonomy and efficiency.  For example, Jerold Auerbach describes the 
arbitration law reform movement that led to the FAA as having been spearheaded 
by “advocates of commercial autonomy” who saw arbitration as a way “to solve 
their own problems ‘in their own way—without resort to the clumsy and heavy hand 
                                                          
 75. Id. at 309. 
 76. This idea had broad support about the time that the FAA was passed.  See, e.g., ELIHU ROOT, THE 
LAYMAN’S CRITICISM OF THE LAWYER 4 (1914) (“‘This may be law but it is not justice,’ sometimes 
heard, indicates a sense that the rules of law which profess to secure justice in general too often prevent 
justice in the particular case and themselves point out the way in which the adroit and unscrupulous may 
conform to the law and avoid being fair and honest.”). 
 77. William L. Ransom, The Layman’s Demand for Improved Judicial Machinery, in JUSTICE 
THROUGH SIMPLIFIED LEGAL PROCEDURE, 73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 138 (Carl 
Kelsey & Henry W. Jessup eds., 1917). 
 78. Charles L. Bernheimer, The Advantages of Arbitration Procedure, 124 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 98, 99–100 (1926).  See also “People’s Courts” of Arbitration, LITERARY DIGEST, Oct. 4, 
1924, at 14 (describing arbitration tribunals as the “greatest step in twenty-five years to simplify legal 
procedure . . . . and obtain for the poor ‘a degree of justice frankly impossible now’”). 
 79. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT DENIAL OF JUSTICE 
TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION BEFORE THE LAW WITH 
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES 70–72, 129–30, 243–44 (1919). 
 80. Aragaki, supra note 13, at 2003–04 
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of Government.’”81  Likewise, Margaret Moses explains the motivation behind the 
FAA in terms of “[b]usinessmen need[ing] solutions that were simpler, faster, and 
cheaper.”82  Thomas Stipanowich, too, views the early twentieth century arbitration 
reform movement as championing “a more efficient, less costly, and more final 
method for resolving disputes.”83 
To be sure, there is truth to these claims.  Cohen and other key proponents of 
the FAA sometimes justified the liberalization of arbitration law by reference to 
George Jessel’s famous paean to freedom of contract: “[I]f there is one thing which 
more than other public policy requires it is that men of full age and competent un-
derstanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting.”84  Likewise, Cohen argued 
to Congress that the FAA was intended to correct three “evils” of litigation, two of 
which were “[t]he long delay usually incident to a proceeding at law” and “[t]he 
expense of litigation.”85  Commentators during the period, too, frequently explained 
the increasing popularity of arbitration as a function of these inefficiencies.86 
But the fact that proponents of the FAA valued autonomy and efficiency does 
not mean that they did not also value justice to the same degree or even more.87  
Consider that autonomy and efficiency values are important underpinnings of judi-
cial procedure,88 yet this in itself does not lead us to think that judicial procedure is 
agnostic about justice.  Quite the contrary, autonomy and efficiency are important 
                                                          
 81. AUERBACH, supra note 17, at 101. 
 82. Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbi-
tration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 103 (2006); see also Thomas V. 
Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect Procedural Justice of Arbitration, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 47, 
50 (2010) (declaring that in passing the FAA, “Congress intended efficiency to be the compelling inter-
est”); Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 568–69 
(2014) (“One reason that Congress passed the FAA was to provide a faster and cheaper alternative to 
litigation.”); Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory Arbitrator and the Demise of 
Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 6, 14, 25–27 (explaining the passage of the FAA as motivated 
by “[b]usinesses want[ing] a simpler, cheaper, and internally administered justice system to resolve their 
common law claims”). 
 83. Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 8; see also Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and 
State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration As a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. 
L. REV. 397, 399–401 (1998) (arguing that, at the time of the FAA’s enactment, arbitration was “believed 
to be more efficient than litigation, less costly and a better process for parties with continuing business 
relationships”). 
 84. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 17 (1918) (quoting Printing & 
Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, [1875] 19 L.R.Eq. 462, 465). 
 85. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. 
Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 34–35 (1924) (brief of Julius Henry Cohen); Comm. 
on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 
A.B.A. J. 153, 155–56 (1925). 
 86. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 42, at 214–15 (arguing that his proposed Court of Arbitration 
would help relieve court backlogs and delays); Wesley A. Sturges, Modern Developments in the Practice 
and Law of Commercial Arbitration, 5 B. BRIEFS 101, 104–5 (1928); Samuel Williston, Fashions in Law 
with Illustrations from the Law of Contracts, 21 TEX. L. REV. 119, 137 (1942); Special Committee Report 
(1925), supra note 70, at 271 (describing the “congestion of the courts, the delays incident to trials, the 
inconvenience in meeting court engagements, [and] the expense” of litigation as contributing causes of 
the turn to arbitration). 
 87. As Justice Burger remarked during the Pound Conference, “[t]here is nothing incompatible be-
tween efficiency and justice.”  Warren E. Burger, An Agenda for 2000 A.D.—A Need for Systematic 
Anticipation, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE, PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 23, 32 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). 
 88. See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 324–30 
(1997); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 252–64 (2004). 
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precisely because they can be an important means of furthering the overriding goal, 
which is to secure a fair adjudication of the merits.89  In a system plagued by un-
necessary delay and expense, witnesses die or forget details (or, worse, ‘remember’ 
events years after the fact with suspicious clarity).90  Crucial evidence disappears.91  
Resource asymmetries between the litigants—which scholars such as Judith Resnik 
have identified as a central concern of due process92—force weaker parties to abdi-
cate their rights.93 
From this perspective, the crux of Cohen’s arguments to Congress about the 
“evils” of delay and expense was not so much that these things were problems in 
themselves, but that they amounted to an effective denial of justice.94  Much the 
same can be said about autonomy.  Proponents of the FAA advocated for freedom 
of contract in dispute resolution not so much because they sought to escape the rule 
of law95 but because, consistent with the prevailing philosophy of “less is more,” 
they believed that parties and/or administering institutions with greater expertise in 
the subject matter of commercial disputes were likely to craft better procedural rules 
to govern arbitration than legislatures or courts.96 
Moreover, there is no reason in principle why merchants should be less inter-
ested than non-merchants in the value of justice.97  Around the time the FAA was 
passed, arbitration was sometimes portrayed as a way of clarifying the rights of the 
                                                          
 89. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories 
of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 507–10 (2003); Burger, supra note 87, at 32 (“Efficiency 
. . . is not an end in itself.  It has as its objective the very purpose of the whole system—to do justice.”). 
 The procedural reforms that eventually led to the Federal Rules, too, were often billed as an anti-
dote to the delay and expense of civil litigation, yet this has never led us to question the commitment of 
those reforms to justice.  See, e.g., Adolph J. Rodenbeck, The New Practice in New York, 1 CORNELL 
L.Q. 63, 63 (1916); Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed 
Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 35 ABA REP. 614, 615 (1910) (advocating 
uniform federal procedure to “diminish the expense and delay of litigation”). Thus, one of the stated 
purposes of the so-called Cummins bill on uniform federal procedure was to encourage “speedier and 
more intelligent disposition of the issues presented . . . and . . . a reduction of the expense of litigation.”  
S. REP. NO. 69–1174, at 2 (1926). 
 90. See, e.g., A.C. Lappin, The Case of Arbitration vs. Litigation, 39 COM. L.J. 196, 198 (1934); Ed-
ward R. Finch, Is Our Law Adequately Administered?, 50 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 532, 535 (1927). 
 91. Joseph Wheless, Arbitration As a Judicial Process of Law. A New Era in Legal Procedure Created 
by the New York and New Jersey Statutes. The Principles and the Practice Defined, 30 W. VA. L. Q. 
209, 210–11 (1924). 
 92. Resnik,  supra note 19, at 82. 
 93. Lappin, supra note 90, at 198 (arguing that delay allowed “the stronger and richer litigant to force 
the weaker and poorer to surrender regardless of the merits” and recommending arbitration as a solution 
to this and other problems); see also Ransom, The Organization of the Courts, supra note 43, at 270–
72; Elihu Root, Reform of Procedure, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF 
THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 87 (1911); Nordlinger, supra note 57, at 622 (“It has long 
been considered sound advice that . . . . it is more advantageous to surrender your legal rights without 
litigation than to enforce them through litigation.”); Sturges, supra note 64, at 481. 
 94. Where Jury Trial Fails, 9 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 71, 72 (1925) (“Courts come to exist largely for the 
comfort and protection of debtors in a manner wholly contrary to our exalted principles of doing jus-
tice.”).  Hence the common refrain during the period that “justice delayed is justice denied.”  William 
Renwick Riddell, The Administration of Justice, 34 CAN. L. TIMES 885, 898 (1914) (emphasis added). 
 95. See infra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 96. Aragaki, supra note 13, at 1982–86, 1991–93.  Shortly after the passage of the FAA, the American 
Judicature Society observed that modern arbitration statutes “wisely refrain[ed] from laying down elab-
orate rules for arbitrators to follow[].”  The Technique of Arbitration, 9 J. AM. JUD. SOC’Y 79, 79 (1925).  
Rather than take this as an indication that such rules were unimportant, the Society concluded that such 
rules, while “needed,” were more “properly adopted by trade associations.”  Id. 
 97. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 204–06 (2006). 
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parties so that future disputes could be avoided.98  Many commercial disputes were 
adjudicated based on a strict evaluation of the rights and duties of the parties under 
the law.99  This is perhaps what led Ransom to observe that “[i]t is not a desire to 
avoid the application of rules of law which drives business men out of the courts. . 
. . The aversion of the average man is rather to the procedural and administrative 
side of our legal machinery.”100  As witnesses testifying in Congress and others 
writing during this period argued, businesses were flocking to arbitration precisely 
because procedural technicalities and wrangling by lawyers made it impossible for 
public courts to adjudicate cases on their proper merits.101  It bears noting that busi-
ness interests were also a key contingent behind the procedural reform movement 
that led to the Federal Rules,102 which surely indicates that business interests were 
not necessarily opposed to the promotion of substantial justice. 
IV.   CAN ARBITRATION DELIVER JUSTICE TODAY? 
My goal in Part III was not to make an empirical claim that, around the time of 
the FAA’s enactment, arbitration actually produced results that we could consider 
just.  This would be an exceedingly difficult claim to vindicate, requiring a wealth 
of data about individual cases and a compelling normative framework for evaluat-
ing whether a particular result counts as “just.”  Instead, my aim was to illustrate 
that it is not inconceivable that arbitration should be constructed as a forum com-
mitted to justice rather than (or in addition to) party autonomy and process effi-
ciency.  For in the decades leading up to the passage of the FAA, arbitration was 
widely understood in precisely this way. 
                                                          
 98. As Cohen and Dayton observed, businessmen of the period generally “draw their contracts in the 
light of ordinary rules of law” and that in arbitration, parties “ha[ve] the right to expect that [their] con-
tract will be construed in accordance with such rules.”  JULIUS HENRY COHEN & KENNETH DAYTON, 
HANDBOOK AND GUIDE TO COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION UNDER THE NEW YORK AND UNITED STATES 
ARBITRATION STATUTES INCLUDING A SUMMARY OF THE PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION, AND FORMS 26–
27 (Chamber of Commerce of the State of N.Y. 1932); see also Special Committee Report (1925), supra 
note 70, at 273. 
 99. See, e.g., BIRDSEYE, supra note 70, at 92–93 (explaining that the New York Chamber of Com-
merce’s Court of Arbitration functioned “rather as a court of law in deciding many new and intricate 
points which arose in connection with commercial disputes”); Moses H. Grossman, The Need of Arbi-
tration to Relieve the Congestion in the Courts 10 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. CITY N.Y. 211, 213 (1923) 
(arguing that arbitration is suitable even where “the controversy is intricate and the law applicable is 
doubtful” and stating that arbitrators can be selected from “jurists of the highest type, profoundly versed 
in law”). 
 100. Ransom, The Layman’s Demand for Improved Judicial Machinery, supra note 77, at 148; see also 
SMITH, supra note 79, at 69–70 (calling it a “fact . . . of the highest importance” that the expansion of 
arbitration does not imply dissatisfaction with the “rules of substantive law”). 
 101. Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 Before the Subcomm. of 
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 26–29, 48 (1915); Shelton, Greater Efficacy of the 
Trial of Civil Cases, supra note 43, at 664. 
 102. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 500–
501 (1986) (noting the irony in the fact that that leading procedural reformers, often associated with 
interests of the “defense bar” proposed reforms that opened courthouse doors to “a new host of rights 
seekers,” by facilitating classwide relief and liberal discovery that “shone a beacon on corporate and 
government practices”); Subrin, supra note 32, at 948–49, 959–60, 969–73 (noting the irony of how 
conservative and liberal ideologies coalesced to help ensure the passage of the Rules Enabling Act and 
its eventual implementation in the form of the Federal Rules). 
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The question remains how helpful this excursion into the history of the FAA is 
for modern debates about arbitration, especially in the so-called “mandatory” bind-
ing arbitration area.  Can arbitration supporters today (like their counterparts circa 
1925) credibly portray an adjudicative system with no guarantee of discovery, no 
evidentiary rules, and no meaningful substantive review as harboring a commitment 
to justice that is as strong as or more so than its commitment to autonomy or effi-
ciency? 
My purpose in this Part is not to provide a definitive answer this question so 
much as to claim that the question itself deserves more serious consideration.  I 
therefore interrogate some common misapprehensions about arbitration’s informal-
ism that help drive the perception that arbitration either is not, or cannot, be com-
mitted to justice in adjudication.  Although I remain agnostic about the ultimate 
answer to the question, I suggest that confronting some of these misconceptions 
helps make the question itself more complex, and in this sense more compelling. 
A. Discovery 
One bone of contention in contemporary debates about arbitration has to do 
with access to discovery.  For instance, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s 
recent study of mandatory binding arbitration notes that “limited discovery rights 
are the hallmark of arbitration” and that arbitration rules “generally envision less 
discovery than would be available in court.”103  Proponents of arbitration sometimes 
fuel this impression by contending that limited discovery is an aspect of arbitra-
tion’s “fundamental nature.”104 
As an empirical matter, however, it is difficult to know whether there is actually 
less discovery in arbitration than in litigation.  To begin with, discovery is hardly a 
routine staple of civil litigation.  Available empirical evidence suggests that it is not 
used at all in more than half of the civil cases pending in the federal courts.105  On 
                                                          
 103. Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU § 4.6 (Mar. 2015) (quo-
tation omitted), http://perma.cc/5PLG-LLKY. 
 104. David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will 
Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY 
J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 1, 25 (2003); see also IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., 3 FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: 
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, § 34.1, at 34:2 
(1999) (“Limitations on discovery . . . remain one of the hallmarks of American commercial arbitration, 
including arbitration under the FAA. Avoidance of the delay and expense associated with discovery is 
still one of the reasons parties choose to arbitrate.”). 
The rationale is typically that “[u]nlimited discovery is incompatible with the goals of efficiency 
and economy.”  2007 Non-Administered Arbitration Rules, INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & 
RESOL. at Rule 11 (2007), available at http://www.cpradr.org/RulesCaseServ-
ices/CPRRules/2007CPRNon-AdministeredArbitrationRules.aspx; REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION 
ACT § 17, cmt. 2 (2000) (“extensive discovery . . . eliminates the main advantages of arbitration in terms 
of cost, speed and efficiency”).  Here, too, it rarely occurs to critics and supporters alike that arbitration 
eschews unbridled discovery for reasons that sound in justice—for instance, to reduce the negative im-
pact on parties with fewer resources, who may be pressured to compromise valid claims before reaching 
a hearing on the merits.  See generally Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: 
A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978) (noting the way that discovery 
rights can be used to obstruct the ascertainment of truth and the pursuit of justice). 
 105. See PAUL R. CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS 
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 28 (1978) (finding that approximately 52% of federal 
district court cases surveyed had no recorded discovery requests while 95.1% had 10 or fewer requests); 
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the other hand, commentators have long noted that discovery in arbitration is now 
fairly routine.106  Some speculate that discovery in arbitration currently equals or 
rivals what is available in court,107 both because there are fewer express discovery 
limits (such as the provisional limit of 10 depositions in federal court)108 to constrain 
lawyers and because arbitrators hoping for repeat business may be sheepish about 
denying lawyer requests for additional discovery.109  It is also not unknown for par-
ties to provide in their agreement that the arbitration proceeding (including discov-
ery) will be conducted according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.110 
Even if the absolute quantum of discovery in arbitration is less than it is in 
litigation, it is a further question what to make of this difference.  Many judges and 
scholars have argued that discovery practice in the United States has spiraled out of 
control and that much of the discovery taken in litigation is either unnecessary or 
serves to hinder rather than promote the ascertainment of truth.111  Reforms in the 
administration of justice have therefore largely sought to reduce—not expand—the 
scope of available discovery.112  Some, like Second Circuit Judge Jon Newman, 
appear quite comfortable with even more drastic discovery limits: 
                                                          
James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Eval-
uation Data, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 613, 621–23 (1998) (“[T]he majority of the civil cases have either no 
discovery or limited discovery . . . .”); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 72, 89–90 (1983) (reporting no evidence of discovery in half of cases surveyed); Thomas 
E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal 
Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 540 (1998). 
 106. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel, 
Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271, 277 (2007) (“In some contexts, such as securities and complex 
commercial cases, arbitration has become highly formalized, with routine discovery and motion practice, 
the application of substantive legal rules, and written and reasoned awards.”); Thomas Stipanowich, 
Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 414 
(2009) (“Legal counselors should be aware, however, that the old ‘no discovery in arbitration’ maxim is 
generally inaccurate and some amount of discovery usually takes place under standard arbitration 
rules.”). 
 107. Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 9, 12–15 (arguing that “arbitration procedures have become in-
creasingly like the civil procedures they were designed to supplant, including prehearing discovery and 
motion practice”); Thomas Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration: 
Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 297, 349 (2014) (“In the United States, 
commercial arbitration hearings are often preceded by weeks or months of prehearing discovery.”). 
 108. See Stipanowich, supra note 106, at 387 (noting the irony that the very same complaints about no-
holds-barred discovery exist in arbitration, where there are fewer mandatory rules and parties have 
greater freedom to design a discovery process that makes sense for their dispute). 
 109. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the 
Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 717 (2004). 
 110. Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 12 n.62. 
 111. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT ON 
THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND 
THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 7–16 (2009); Brazil, supra 
note 104, at 1303–31; Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, in THE POUND 
CONFERENCE, supra note 87, at 51, 61 (“Many actions are instituted on the basis of a hope that discovery 
will reveal a claim.”); John D. Shugrue, Identifying and Combating Discovery Abuse, 23 LITIG., 10, 10 
(1997); Willging et al., supra note 105, at 531, 547–53, 575, 584. 
 112. See, e.g., Court Rules, 192 F.R.D. 340, 388–90 (2000) (amending Rule 26 to limit discovery to 
matters “relevant to any party’s claim or defense” rather than to matters “relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action,” unless prior court authorization is obtained); Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165, 213–18 (1983) (amending Rule 26 to give the court authority to minimize 
redundant, repetitive, and disproportionate discovery); Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 526–27 (1980) (amending Rule 26 to provide for court intervention to assist 
counsel in curbing discovery abuse). 
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I doubt that discovery should be routinely permitted.  Where discovery is 
needed, I doubt that depositions should be permitted beyond two or three, 
limited to one hour, that interrogatories should be permitted beyond five 
or ten, and that any but precisely identified documents need be searched 
for and produced.113 
Limited discovery is typically thought to be important for arbitration in order 
to keep the proceedings fast and cheap—at least relative to taking the same case to 
court.114  But if Newman and other critics of litigation-style discovery are correct, 
limited discovery may also help promote the cause of justice—that is, it may play 
an important role in ensuring that disputes get resolved on their substantive merits 
rather than get abandoned or compromised. 
Here it is sometimes objected that, unlike in litigation, there is no right to dis-
covery in arbitration;115 thus, even if the overall extent of discovery in arbitration 
and litigation is comparable or if excessive discovery is problematic, at least liti-
gants in court are guaranteed a certain discovery baseline.  The objection is sound 
insofar as the nearly one hundred year-old FAA contains no discovery guarantees.  
But that need not imply that the FAA is opposed in principle to broad rights of 
discovery.  For procedural codes in effect at the time the FAA was passed also did 
not provide for the type of liberal, lawyer-driven discovery that would later become 
a hallmark of the 1938 Federal Rules.116 
In any event, the more recent Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) and 
many current state arbitration statutes vest considerable discretion in the arbitrator 
to order discovery.117  The California Arbitration Act, for instance, gives parties the 
right to take depositions and to obtain discovery regarding the subject mat-
ter of the arbitration, and, to that end, to use and exercise all of the same 
rights, remedies, and procedures, and be subject to all of the same duties, 
liabilities, and obligations in the arbitration with respect to the subject mat-
ter thereof . . . as if the subject matter of the arbitration were pending be-
fore a superior court of this state in a civil action other than a limited civil 
case . . . .118 
The rules of leading private arbitration providers also typically give arbitrators 
broad powers to order discovery.119 
                                                          
 113. Jon O. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 
1650–51 (1985). 
 114. E.g., Sherwyn, supra note 104, at 25–26. 
 115. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 7, at 283. 
 116. See Stephen Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal 
Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 691–701 (1998). 
 117. The RUAA has been enacted in 18 states and the District of Columbia.  Legislative Fact Sheet, 
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION (2016)   http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Arbi-
tration%20Act%20%282000%29.  It provides: “An arbitrator may permit such discovery as the arbitra-
tor decides is appropriate in the circumstances, taking into account the needs of the parties to the arbi-
tration proceeding and other affected persons and the desirability of making the proceeding fair, expedi-
tious, and cost effective.”  REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, § 17(c) (2002). 
 118. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1283.05. 
 119. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES 19 (2014) (Rule 9) (“The arbitrator shall have the authority to order such discovery, by 
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At the same time, it is questionable the extent to which litigation affords an 
absolute “right” to discovery.  Beyond requiring parties to make certain initial dis-
closures,120 discovery under the Federal Rules is largely a matter of judicial discre-
tion.121  For example, although Rule 30(a)(2)(A)(i) provides that each side may take 
up to 10 depositions without seeking leave of the court, there is nothing to stop the 
court from reducing that limit in less complex cases.122  Any such decision would 
moreover be extremely difficult to overturn on appeal.123  The upshot is that, rather 
than being rule-bound, discovery under the Federal Rules is in fact highly informal.  
It is ironic that in debates over civil procedure we have tended to regard this infor-
malism as the cause of too much discovery,124 yet in the arbitration context we are 
apt to interpret the absence of a Federal Rules discovery regime as the cause of just 
the opposite: too little discovery.125 
B. Evidence 
Today, an arbitrator’s ability to disregard the rules of evidence is at best an 
argument for why arbitration promises greater party autonomy or process effi-
ciency.  Some critics write as if there are no rules about evidence in arbitration at 
all, which leaves the erroneous impression that arbitrators may ignore relevant and 
material facts with impunity.126  More sophisticated critics suggest that the lack of 
clear rules makes the admission of evidence in arbitration relatively haphazard or 
                                                          
way of deposition, interrogatory, document production, or otherwise, as the arbitrator considers neces-
sary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with the expedited nature of arbitra-
tion.”); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES 19–20 (2014) (Rule 22); JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES 21–22 (2014); 
JAMS, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES 17–18 (2014); Administered Arbitration Rules, INT’L INST. 
FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (July 1, 2013), http://www.cpradr.org/RulesCaseServ-
ices/CPRRules/AdministeredArbitrationRules.aspx (Rule 11); Employment Arbitration Procedure, 
INT’L INST. FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL. (2009) (Art. 11). 
 120. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(a). 
 121. Id. 26(b)(1). 
 122. Id. 26(b)(2)(C).  See Myers v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 581 F. Supp. 2d 904, 913 (E.D. Tenn. 
2008) (“Much of discovery is a fishing expedition of sorts, but the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
allow the Courts to determine the pond, the type of lure, and how long the parties can leave their lines 
in the water.”). 
 123. Ahlberg v. Chrysler Corp., 481 F.3d 630, 637–638 (8th Cir. 2007) (reviewing discovery orders 
for “gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case”); Michael L. 
Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 461, 471 (2007). 
 124. Francis Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation—Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 
202 (1979) (“[W]hen discovery—totally unlimited because no issue is framed—mulls over millions of 
papers, translates them to microfilm and feeds them into computers to find out if they can be shuffled 
into any relevance . . . we should, I think, consider whether noble experiments [embodied in the Federal 
Rules] have gone awry.”); Edward F. Sherman & Stephen O. Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 
‘80s—Making the Rules Work, 95 F.R.D. 245, 246 (1982) (observing that the Federal Rules’ permissive 
provisions on discovery tend toward “over discovery”). 
 125. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
 126. E.g., Norman T. Braslow, Contractual Stipulation for Judicial Review and Discovery in United 
States-Japan Arbitration Contracts, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 659, 663–64 (2004); Stacy A. Hickox, En-
suring Enforceability and Fairness in the Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 
101, 133 (2010); cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (concluding that arbitra-
tion was “comparatively inferior to judicial processes” in protecting Title VII rights in part because “the 
factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial factfinding. . . . [T]he usual rules 
of evidence do not apply.”). 
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simply less extensive than it would be in a court of law, such that crucial evidence 
might inadvertently be excluded.127  The implication is that arbitration’s informal-
ism with respect to evidence makes it a less fair or just process than litigation. 
But to say that arbitrators have the discretion to disregard evidentiary rules is 
plainly not the same as saying that arbitrators are free to disregard the evidence 
itself.128  The FAA, RUAA, and the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) all provide for 
vacatur of an award resulting from an arbitrator’s “refus[al] to hear evidence perti-
nent and material to the controversy.”129  Nor is this a recent development, since 
substantially the same standard for vacatur applied to common law arbitrations well 
before the twentieth century.130  This standard was also incorporated in many state 
arbitration statutes around the time the FAA was conceived and enacted.131  As Co-
hen and Kenneth Dayton explained: 
The law requires the arbitrators to give the parties every reasonable opportunity 
to secure and present their evidence and to hear all pertinent and material evidence 
which either party may offer.  If they deny a hearing to a party, or hear only part of 
his case, or refuse to hear any pertinent and material evidence, the award will be 
invalid.  The better practice is to listen to all evidence which a party wishes to pre-
sent, unless it is clearly outside the case or repetitious.132 
                                                          
 127. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer 
Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 49–53. 
 128. E.g., Soia Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration–A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 704–06 (1952). 
Consider that the rules of evidence are relaxed during bench trials, yet this in itself does not lead 
us to believe that bench trials are inherently more unfair or inaccurate than jury trials.  See Elizabeth 
Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 203.  Even in jury trials, the enforcement of 
evidentiary rules is not guaranteed and depends on the active vigilance of counsel.  See Richard A. Pos-
ner, Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 VA. L. REV. 1713, 1714 n.8 (2001) (“Most lawyers and judges 
have quite a relaxed sense of the rules of evidence, often ignoring them by tacit agreement and not only 
in bench trials.”). 
 129. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2012); REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 23(a)(3), 15(d) (2000) 
(providing an additional ground for vacatur where arbitrator conducted the hearing “contrary to section 
15” which, inter alia, provides that parties have “the right to be heard, to present evidence material to 
the controversy, and to cross-examine witnesses appearing at the hearing”); UNIFORM ARBITRATION 
ACT § 12(a)(4) (1955). 
 130. Michael LeRoy traces the origins of the FAA’s vacatur standards even further back to English 
common law which, among other things, treated “misbehaviour” of the arbitrators as a ground for setting 
aside awards.  LeRoy, supra note 82, at 30–31.  Although LeRoy does not specifically claim that the 
refusal to hear material and relevant evidence was considered to be an instance of such “misbehaviour,” 
the FAA appears to do so.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (providing for vacatur “where the arbitrators were guilty 
of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, . . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and mate-
rial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior . . . . [emphasis added]”).  Likewise, Corpus Juris 
identified the “refus[al] to hear competent and material evidence” as an aspect of arbitrator “misconduct” 
warranting vacatur.  5 CORPUS JURIS, § 484, at 191 & n.55 (1921) (collecting cases). 
 131. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1288 (1927); 1929 Conn. Pub. Acts chap. 65, § 11; 1925 Haw. 
Rev. Laws § 2932; 1919 Idaho Comp. Stat. § 7434; IND. CODE § 941 (1926); 1928 La. Acts No. 262 
§ 10; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 13654 (1915); MINN. STAT.  § 9517 (1927); MISS. CODE ANN. § 94 (1927); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 604 (1919); MONT. CODE ANN.  § 9978 (1921); Nev. Laws chap. 7, § 16 (1925); 1923 
N.J. Laws chap. 134, § 9; 1921 N.Y. Laws chap. 199, § 1457; N.C. Code § 898(p) (1927); 1927 Pa. 
Laws No. 248, § 10; 1929 R.I. Pub. Laws chap. 1408, § 10; 1927 Utah Laws chap. 62, § 16; WISC. STAT. 
§ 298.10 (1927); 1927 Wyo. Sess. Laws chap. 96, § 16.  The Uniform Arbitration Act of 1925 likewise 
provided for vacatur of arbitral awards where the arbitrators “refus[ed] to hear evidence, pertinent and 
material to the controversy” or were guilty of “any other misbehavior.”  UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 
16(c) (1925). 
 132. COHEN AND DAYTON, supra note 98, at 23–24; see also Julius Henry Cohen, Hand Book for Ar-
bitrators, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A METHOD FOR THE ADJUSTMENT, WITHOUT LITIGATION, OF 
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Second, the fact that traditional evidence rules do not apply does not mean that 
less evidence is admitted in arbitration than in litigation.  For example, Richard 
Delgado reasons that, because evidence rules “are intended to facilitate introduction 
of all relevant evidence,”133 procedures such as arbitration that lack binding 
evidentiary rules tend to hinder the introduction of evidence.  In fact it is just the 
opposite: The rules of evidence function primarily to exclude, rather than include, 
evidence.134  Generally speaking, therefore, fewer evidence rules mean that more 
evidence is considered by the trier of fact.135  This is consistent with the common 
perception that “arbitrators tend to let in most or all proffered evidence.”136 
Arbitration handbooks and practice guides in circulation around the time the 
FAA was passed also uniformly encouraged arbitrators to err on the side of consid-
ering more, rather than less, evidence and to ignore technical rules of exclusion such 
as the hearsay rule and rules on opinion testimony.  “Wherever there exists doubt 
as to whether certain testimony is admissible under one of the numerous exceptions 
[to the hearsay rule],” explained Kellor, one of the founding members of the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association (AAA), “it would seem to be the better practice for the 
arbitrators to admit such evidence . . . .”137  The rationale for this bias was (and 
remains) quite simple: it reduces the risk that an award will be vacated because 
evidence was incorrectly excluded.138 
Finally, even if judicial rules of evidence do not govern in arbitration proceed-
ings, they are nonetheless part of a reservoir of shared practices and values that are 
persuasive on parties and arbitrators.  Arbitration takes place against a background 
set of customs and values that make certain moves possible and others beyond the 
pale.139  When disputes over evidence arise, parties and arbitrators are likely to turn 
to rules for the admission of evidence in court (and any relevant commentary and 
case law) for guidance.140 
                                                          
DIFFERENCES ARISING BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS, FIRMS, OR CORPORATIONS 47, 51 (N.Y. Chamber of 
Comm. ed., 1911) [hereinafter Hand Book for Arbitrators] (“Arbitrators must before the proceeding is 
closed, take and consider all evidence that is material and pertinent to the controversy that is offered by 
either party.”). 
 133. Delgado et al., supra note 18, at 1373 (emphasis added). 
 134. Wigmore, supra note 63, at 539 (describing the rules of evidence as “mainly aimed at guarding 
the jury from the overweening effect of certain kinds of evidence”). 
 135. See FRANCES KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION: A CODE FOR CIVIL, COMMERCIAL, AND 
INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATIONS 99 (1941). 
 136. Schwartz, supra note 127, at 48 n. 42 (citation omitted); KELLOR, supra note 135, at 98 (“[A]s no 
penalty attaches to the admission of evidence that is neither pertinent nor relevant, arbitrators will not 
greatly curtail the admission of evidence, even though they may be satisfied that it has no bearing on the 
issue.”).  One respondent to the New York City Bar Association’s survey remarked as follows: “It has 
been my experience in arbitrating cases that arbitrators usually listen to a great deal of pertinent evidence 
having a distinct bearing on the case which in the case of litigation might be objected to by an attorney 
and ruled out.”  Special Committee Report (1925), supra note 70, at 309. 
 137. KELLOR, supra note 135, at 101; see MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE 
IN ARBITRATION 4, 15 (2d ed. 1987); MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 104, § 35.1.2.4, at 35:8–9. 
 138. See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text. 
 139. Motion practice is an example.  Even where provider rules fail to authorize motion practice, it has 
developed spontaneously based on what lawyers and arbitrators are accustomed to in litigation.  See, 
e.g., Michael Hoellering. Dispositive Motions in Arbitration. 1 ADR CURRENTS 1, 8 (1996). 
 140. See, e.g., 2009 AAA Employment LEXIS 240 (James Greenwood, III, Arb.) (turning to state rule 
of evidence for guidance regarding when negligence may be inferred from circumstantial evidence); 
2000 AAA Employment LEXIS 152 (William H. Ewing, Arb.) (stating that “legal rules of evidence . . . 
should apply in arbitration proceedings unless there is a very good reason for departing from them”); 
1999 AAA Employment LEXIS 58 (Pamela J. White, Arb.) (noting that arbitrator was “guided by the 
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Consider what happens in arbitration when a party introduces hearsay testi-
mony or a document that is alleged to bear the signature of a particular individual.  
Does the fact that there are no governing rules of evidence mean that the other side 
will be prevented from raising an objection or that the arbitrator will admit the evi-
dence without batting an eyelid?  Unlikely.  Nor does it necessarily mean that the 
other side will fail to raise an objection, since it does not take legal training to ap-
preciate the reliability problems inherent in hearsay testimony and unauthenticated 
documents.  To be sure, there is no guarantee that the objection will actually be 
raised by a party or properly considered by the arbitrator in these circumstances.  
But the same is true in court, since evidentiary objections can be (and often are) 
waived.141  And even when the objection is made, any error in admitting or rejecting 
the evidence is typically reviewable only if it had a demonstrable, non-harmless 
effect on the outcome.142 
C. Appeal 
The relative lack of substantive merits review in arbitration is also taken as a 
telltale sign that arbitration’s normative focus is not on justice or accuracy in out-
comes but on other values such as autonomy or efficiency.  For example, David 
Schwartz argues that “[a]rbitration is ‘despotic decisionmaking’ in the sense that 
the governing law makes arbitrator’s decisions virtually unreviewable while accept-
ing procedural and substantive results that would be considered unfair in a judicial 
setting.”143  Even commentators broadly supportive of arbitration sometimes pro-
ceed from this assumption.  Thus, Paul Kirgis argues that the FAA’s very limited 
grounds for vacatur or modification of arbitral awards—none of which provides 
relief for substantive legal errors144—evinces a “contractarian model” of arbitration, 
one that he believes was first put forward by merchants and commercial lawyers 
who pushed the FAA through Congress.145  This, in turn, suggests to Kirgis that the 
FAA’s purpose was to promote contractual autonomy rather than adjudicative 
justice.146 
                                                          
Federal Rules of Evidence”); 1999 AAA Employment LEXIS 47 (Kevin B. Krauss, Arb.) (stating that 
the arbitrator used state rules of evidence and civil procedure “as a guide in processing this claim”). 
 141. Richard A. Posner, Comment on Lempert on Posner, 87 VA. L. REV. 1713, 1714 n.8 (2001) (“Most 
lawyers and judges have quite a relaxed sense of the rules of evidence, often ignoring them by tacit 
agreement and not only in bench trials.”). 
 142. FED. R. EVID. 103. 
 143. Schwartz, supra note 127, at 38. 
 144. 9 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11 (2012). 
 145. See Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitral Authority: Lessons from the Law of 
Contract, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 99, 99–103 (2006). 
 146. See id.; Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and Its Implications for Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 85 OR. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006).  In my view, what Kirgis overlooks is that the 
FAA’s supposedly informal vacatur standards did not appear for the first time in the FAA; they were 
lifted verbatim from the premodern New York arbitration law in existence at least as of 1869, which in 
turn codified New York’s common law vacatur rules.  Aragaki, supra note 13, at 1951 & n. 57.  The 
barebones vacatur provisions in the FAA are therefore more consistent with the earlier, “procedural 
model” of arbitration that Kirgis believes was replaced by modern arbitration law’s contractarian em-
phasis.  See Kirgis, Judicial Review, supra note 145, at 99. 
 Interestingly, Edward Brunet also points to the limited grounds for vacatur in FAA section 10 as 
evidence of the contract model, but largely for the opposite reason.  Brunet believes that, in sharp contrast 
to an earlier paradigm of “folklore” arbitration, section 10 contemplates a much more modern, judicial-
ized version of arbitration that actually provides too many grounds to challenge the award.  Edward 
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But claims that substantive merits review either does not exist as a factual mat-
ter in arbitration or is normatively incompatible with the idea of arbitration are 
themselves matters of contention.  At the time the FAA was passed, appellate boards 
were regularly used by chambers of commerce and trade associations.147  There also 
appears to have been some willingness on the part of such groups to establish a 
system of precedent through published commercial arbitration reports that would 
become “generally recognized and accepted as sound business doctrine by those 
engaged in commerce.”148  In more recent times, some arbitration supporters have 
urged the adoption of limited substantive merits review on the ground that it would 
improve the legitimacy and fairness of the process.149  Major arbitration providers 
such as the AAA and JAMS have also promulgated appellate arbitration proce-
dures.150  Moreover, several states currently allow parties to contract for de novo 
judicial review of an arbitrators’ award.151  Several federal circuits also followed 
                                                          
Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 77–
78 (1999).  Unlike Kirgis, therefore, for Brunet it is the formalism of section 10 that makes it more 
consistent with autonomy. 
 147. The arbitration rules of several such groups provided for appellate arbitration.  See, e.g., Grain 
Dealers Nat’l Ass’n Arbitration Rules, Art. IV (1923), in SELECTED ARTICLES ON COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, supra note 42, at 105, 108–09; H. ARTHUR DUNN AND HENRY P. DIMOND, COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, BEING A COMPILATION OF AWARDS OF ARBITRATION COMMITTEES OF VARIOUS TRADE 
ASSOCIATIONS AND CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES 275–76, 279–80, 283–84, 286–
90, 295, 304, 306 (1922) (setting forth rules of the Chicago and New Orleans Boards of Trade, among 
several others); Philip G. Phillips, Rules of Law or Laissez-Faire in Commercial Arbitration, 47 HARV. 
L. REV. 590, 623 (1934) (“One is immediately struck in examining the trade association rules by the 
large number providing for an appeal after an arbitrator’s decision to another board of arbitration.”). 
 148. DUNN & DIMOND, supra note 147, at i (compiling and publishing redacted decisions provided for 
this purpose by trade associations and chambers of commerce “covering important trade customs and 
the interpretation of familiar contract terms, problems that arise daily in almost every active line of com-
merce”). 
 149. See, e.g., James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a 
Rule Providing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 9, 97–102 (2004) (urging providers to adopt procedures allowing parties to obtain reconsid-
eration of arbitral awards). 
 150. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, OPTIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (2013) available at http://im-
ages.go.adr.org/Web/AmericanArbitrationAssociation/%7B9e172798-c60f-4de0-9ebc-
438e54e78af8%7D_AAA_ICDR_Optional_Appellate_Arbitration_Rules.pdf; JAMS FOUNDATION, 
OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE 2–5 (2003), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Optional_Appeal_Procedures-
2003.pdf; Rules of Arbitration, GREEN COFFEE ASS’N Art. XVII, http://www.greencoffeeassocia-
tion.org/images/uploads/resources/PROFESSIONAL_RESOURCES-Arbitration_Rules.pdf (last vis-
ited Mar. 21, 2016).  The extent to which appellate arbitration procedures are currently used, however, 
remains an open question.  See Brief for American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 23, Hall St. Assocs v. Mattel, 550 U.S. 968 (2007) (No. 06–989) (reporting that “less 
than one percent of arbitration agreements submitted to [the AAA] for administration contain provisions 
for appellate review”). 
 151. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B–4c (West Supp. 2013); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 
84, 97–98 (Tex. 2011); Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea, 55 So. 3d 1161, 1169–70 (Ala. 2010); 
Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 597–98 (Cal. 2008). Cf. HH East Parcel LLC 
v. Handy & Harman, Inc., 947 A.2d 916, 926 n.16 (Conn. 2008) (stating two months after the Court’s 
decision in Hall Street that “[p]arties to agreements remain, however, free to contract for expanded ju-
dicial review of an arbitrator’s findings”) (dictum). 
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this practice until 2008,152 when the Court put an end to it for agreements governed 
by the FAA.153 
Second, as Harlan Dalton and others have argued, as a theoretical matter it is 
far from clear that a system with one automatic right of appeal promotes more just 
outcomes than a system without such a right.154  Dalton asks us to consider a simple 
world (i) in which a trial court can be either correct or incorrect on the merits and 
(ii) in which an appellate court has only two options: affirm or reverse.155  This 















Uncertain case for 
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appeal right 
 
The lower right-hand box—incorrect trial court judgment followed by a 
reversal on appeal—offers the strongest affirmative argument for appellate review.  
This is the scenario that critics of arbitration typically focus on when they argue that 
the lack of appellate review in arbitration is an undeniable hallmark of arbitration’s 
lawlessness.157  But what Figure 1 makes clear is that there are three other possible 
alternatives.  With respect to each of these alternatives, the right of appeal threatens 
to create (rather than correct) injustice.  The upper right-hand box—correct trial 
court judgment followed by reversal on appeal—is arguably the worst possible 
outcome because it creates errors that would not have existed but for the appeal 
right.  The upper and lower left-hand boxes both involve scenarios where the 
                                                          
 152. P.R. Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 30–31 (1st Cir. 2005); Kyocera Corp. v. 
Prudential-Bache Trade Servs. Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Bowen v. Amoco 
Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934–37 (9th Cir. 2001). Cf. UHC Mgmt Co. Inc. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 
148 F.3d 992, 997–98 (8th Cir. 1998) (dictum). 
 153. Hall St. Assocs., LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 154. See, e.g., Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for Adopting Dis-
cretionary Review in the Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. REV. 573, 582 (1997); Harlon Leigh 
Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 66 (1985); Irving Wilner, 
Civil Appeals: Are They Useful in the Administration of Justice?, 56 GEO. L.J. 417, 417–19 (1967).  To 
be clear, these commentators do not argue for abolishing all appeals; instead, they advocate a system of 
discretionary review.  See Dalton, supra, at 64. 
 155. See Dalton, supra note 154, at 76. 
 156. Figure 1 and the discussion that follows is substantially based on Dalton’s work.  See id. at 76–81 
 157. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & J.W. Montgomery, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 355, 362–63 (2003). 
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reviewing court simply reiterates the judgment below, in which case it is at least 
debatable the extent to which the right of appeal materially improves upon a system 
of no appellate review.158  In fact, in such cases the right arguably results in less 
accurate outcomes because it imposes added transaction costs: The rightful winner 
or wrongful loser is “forced to subsidize the printing and lawyering industries just 
to wind up in the same place.”159  To avoid these transaction costs, rightful winners 
will often agree to further compromise a correct trial court judgment in exchange 
for the losing party’s waiver of the appeal right.160  Wrongful losers may agree to 
pay far more or receive far less than the actual value of the case for the same reason.  
The upshot is that if each of these four scenarios were equally likely, a concern for 
error correction—setting aside for a minute institutional goals and the appearance 
of legitimacy—does not unequivocally imply the need for an automatic right of 
appeal.  This is perhaps one reason for the Court’s longstanding position that there 
is no due process right to substantive merits review.161 
Extant empirical evidence about the relative probabilities of each scenario 
makes the case for such a right even more problematic.  Appellate courts are known 
to affirm far more than they reverse,162 meaning that the scenario that presents the 
strongest case for one appeal as of right (the lower right hand box in Figure 1) may 
be less common than one might imagine.  Moreover, in the arbitration setting there 
may be an argument for leaving such legally incorrect awards alone rather than 
‘correcting’ them.  This is because arbitrators have the discretion to reach a legally 
incorrect result if they believe it necessary to avoid injustice.  When they do, a 
reversal of that award on grounds of legal error may ensure fealty to the law but at 
the expense of substantial justice in particular cases.  Barbara Black and Jill Gross’s 
study of securities arbitration cases points to this as a distinct possibility.  Black and 
Gross found that for a number of reasons, including that securities law is complex, 
unclear, or favors brokerages, “arbitration panels, on more than an occasional basis, 
are reaching decisions favorable to investors even where the ‘law is clear’ that there 
is no basis for imposing liability on the broker.”163  They predict that investors 
would fare worse in court given the difficulties of proof, the likelihood that a judge 
will apply strict pleading requirements, or simply because “customers’ complaints 
are frequently stronger on the equities . . . while the brokers’ defenses are stronger 
on the law.”164                                                           
 158. There may, of course, be compelling institutional or party-centered reasons why a right of appeal 
is nonetheless justifiable in any of the remaining three scenarios.  I set these other considerations aside, 
however, because the focus of this Symposium contribution is the conceptual link between the right of 
appeal and justice in outcomes. 
 159. Dalton, supra note 154, at 77. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Provided, of course, that due process rights were satisfied in the tribunal of first instance.  See 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972); State of Ohio ex 
rel. Bryant v. Akron Metro. Park Dist. for Summit Cty, 281 U.S. 74, 80 (1930). 
 162. THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, APPEALS FROM GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 
46 LARGE COUNTIES, 2001–2005 4 (2006) (reporting state appellate court reversal rate of 32.7% for civil 
cases); Jon O. Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK L. REV. 629, 633 (1992) (reporting 
that federal appellate courts reverse district court civil judgments only 27% of the time); Margaret P. 
Mason, Note, Courting Reversal: The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87 YALE L.J. 1191, 
1198 n.30, 1199–1200 (1978) (studying decisions from 16 state supreme courts from 1870–1970 and 
finding that the aggregate reversal rate was 38.5%). 
 163. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities 
Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1040 (2002). 
 164. Id. at 1039. 
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At the same time, the other three scenarios, each of which provide reasons 
against a right of appellate review, may be more common than one would expect.  
For example, in their study of federal civil cases terminated between 1988–1997, 
Kevin Clermont and Ted Eisenberg found that losing defendants succeed on appeal 
at a rate of 33% while losing plaintiffs do so at a rate of less than half that—only 
12%.165  They argue that a “major source” of this defense-side bias is a perception 
by appellate courts that trial-level decisionmakers are generally pro-plaintiff, which 
they explain as inducing appellate judges to be “more favorably disposed to the 
defendant” than their trial court counterparts.166  These findings suggest that in a 
not-so-insignificant percentage of cases, courts may be reversing correct trial court 
judgments (upper right-hand scenario). 
Finally, the two left hand scenarios are also likely to be more common than one 
might expect, simply because appellate courts affirm for many reasons that have 
little to do with the actual merits.  For example, depending on the applicable 
standard of review, certain factual and discretionary decisions by the trial judge may 
be allowed to stand even when they are actually erroneous.  Cultural and 
institutional norms may also create an undue presumption in favor of affirmance.  
Examples include a desire for good relations with trial-level judicial colleagues, a 
fear that high reversal rates will drive up appellate filings, or “the strong 
identification, especially by former trial court judges, with those who labor under 
great pressure in the judicial trenches.”167 
V.   CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE SOPHISTICATED 
CONCEPTION OF ARBITRATION’S INFORMALISM 
As arbitration clauses become increasingly common in mass contracts and 
mandatory binding arbitration comes under further scrutiny, I predict that the center 
of gravity of current debates will shift.  Rather than whether adherents truly agreed 
to arbitration clauses or whether arbitration actually saves them time and money, 
the key question will become whether arbitration’s informalism currently pro-
vides—or can be adapted to provide—a fair process for end users, especially con-
sumers and employees.  But by constructing arbitration’s virtues exclusively in 
terms of autonomy and efficiency rather than justice, critics and supporters alike 
may have already predetermined the answer to this question. 
My goal in this Symposium contribution has been to suggest that this construc-
tion of arbitration’s informalism deserves serious reconsideration.  To begin with, 
it would have seemed odd to the judges, lawyers, and disputants who supported 
arbitration around the time the FAA was enacted.  For they considered arbitration 
to be not just more economical and responsive to the needs and wishes of the parties, 
but for these reasons also a more just alternative than litigation in public courts circa 
1925.168  It is also curious as a theoretical matter.  However much it may appear so 
to modern critics of arbitration, informalism is no more antithetical to justice than 
formalism.  As the equity tradition itself attests, informalism has played and con-
tinues to play a vital role in the inevitable balance between ex ante rulemaking and                                                           
 165. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights 
Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 952 (2002). 
 166. Id. at 971. 
 167. Dalton, supra note 154, at 79. 
 168. See supra notes 60–80 and accompanying text. 
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ex post judicial discretion.  Although many speculate that informalism is nonethe-
less more likely in fact to produce injustice than formalism,169 there is no persuasive 
body of empirical evidence to back this up.  Indeed, to Pound and other early twen-
tieth century architects of our current Federal Rules regime, it seemed just the op-
posite: formalism was more likely to cause injustice.  This is why informalism came 
to be a key animating value of the procedural reform movement, as it was for the 
near-contemporaneous arbitration reform movement that helped produce the 
FAA.170 
Is it possible to develop a more sophisticated conception of arbitration’s infor-
malism that would enable us to engage more meaningfully at the level of substantive 
or procedural justice in contemporary debates?  Here I offer three suggestions. 
First, we can no longer think of it as a choice between formalism and informal-
ism.  As a factual matter, informal systems such as Chancery were never completely 
devoid of rules—indeed they depended crucially on them.171  The same is true of 
arbitration.  Soia Mentschikoff made this point when she argued that 
[t]he basic question is not whether rules of procedure or evidence are used 
in arbitration, for they clearly must be; the question is whether the ones 
used in arbitration are geared to the production of a better, in the sense of 
more just, result, than those used in the court process.172 
By the same token, rule-bound systems never manage to purge all ex post bal-
ancing of the equities.173  When they attempt to do so, as Duncan Kennedy argues, 
they typically generate “more uncertainty than would a frank avowal that the judge 
is allocating a loss by reference to an open textured notion of good faith and fair 
dealing.”174  Pure formalism and pure informalism, in other words, are illusory. 
Second, rather than the antithesis of rules, informalism may be better conceived 
as a particular attitude toward rules.  If pure formalism takes rules as ends in them-
selves,175 informalism can be reinterpreted as a flexibility to disregard the literal 
command of a rule in order to fulfill the policies or purposes behind it.  The key is 
                                                          
 169. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 170. Aragaki, supra note 13, at 1977–90. 
 171. Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity, U. OF CHI. L. SCH. 4–5, 17–35 (Mar. 
27, 2012), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Smith%20paper.pdf.  As Judge Posner explained, 
[m]odern equity has rules and standards, just like law.  And although the ratio of rules to standards 
is lower in equity than in law, in cases where the plaintiff has an established entitlement to an 
equitable remedy the judge cannot refuse the remedy because it offends his personal sense of jus-
tice. 
In the Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings Empaneled May 1988, 894 F.2d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 1989) (Pos-
ner, J.). 
 172. Mentschikoff, supra note 128, at 704. 
 173. For example, judges and juries sometimes manipulate legal rules in order to reach outcomes they 
believe are more fair.  See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 97, at 199–200 (citing contemporary studies show-
ing that a significant percentage of judges and jurors admit to disregarding the substantive law in order 
to ensure justice and equity in particular cases). 
 174. Kennedy, supra note 35, at 1700. 
 175. Alexander, supra note 30, at 531 (“By formalism I mean adherence to a norm’s prescription with-
out regard to the background reasons the norm is meant to serve (even when the norm’s prescription fails 
to serve those background reasons in a particular case).”); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 
14 HARV. JL & PUB. POL’Y 645, 649 (1991) (describing rule-based decisionmaking as a determination 
to follow a rule even when doing so “produces the ‘wrong’ result . . . from the perspective of the justifi-
cation undergirding the . . . rule”). 
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that informalism, on this view, does not deny the importance of following rules in 
the first instance.  Cohen and Dayton captured this idea when they remarked that 
businessmen “generally draw their contracts in the light of ordinary rules of law” 
and that, when they go to arbitration, they “expect that their contract will be con-
strued in accordance with [those] rules.”176  But Cohen and Dayton added: “arbitra-
tors will consider such rules and will not ignore them if they think they are fair,”177 
suggesting a view of informalism that does not reject rules outright—just rejects 
following them by rote.  Much the same was true in equity, which was always re-
quired to follow the common law in the first instance.178  From this standpoint, the 
fact that arbitration practice is becoming more rule bound or that parties are incor-
porating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence into 
their arbitration agreements179 may not be a problem in and of itself—indeed it may 
help improve outcomes.  The problem may instead arise when lawyers and arbitra-
tors take an unnecessarily formalistic attitude toward those rules. 
Third, rather than denoting a right or license to discard established rules and 
principles willy nilly, informalism can be regarded as coming with a responsibility 
to stand up to rules when they threaten to produce injustice.  The formalist critique 
has traditionally taken informalism as a source of power rather than duty.  From this 
standpoint, rule-boundedness is justice-enhancing insofar as it curbs the ability to 
abuse power.  But what formalists overlook is that by doing so, rule-boundedness 
also minimizes any space to cultivate responsibility over and above the rote adher-
ence to rules.  Obeying rules thereby becomes not just necessary but also sufficient 
to ensure justice.180 
For example, many critics take the FAA’s relative lack of detailed rules gov-
erning the procedure in arbitration, such as rules about discovery, as placing too 
much discretion in the hands of arbitrators or the party with greater bargaining lev-
erage.181  True enough if following the FAA’s barebones procedural rules is taken 
to be the extent of parties’ and arbitrators’ obligations.  But the other way to under-
stand this informalism is that it calls on us to be proactive about safeguarding justice 
despite what the FAA’s provisions expressly allow or forbid.  Leading proponents 
of arbitration reform in the early twentieth century certainly saw it this way.  They 
argued that, in order for arbitration to reach its full potential, it was not sufficient 
simply to have a federal arbitration statute.  Private organizations such as the AAA 
had to step up to the plate to help ensure the quality and integrity of the process.182  
                                                          
 176. COHEN & DAYTON, supra note 98, at 26–27. 
 177. Id. (emphasis added); see also Hand Book for Arbitrators, supra note 132, at 52 (recommending 
that arbitrators should “disregard pure technicalities” but apply the substantive law so long as it was 
“based upon sound sense and the experience of mankind generally”). 
 178. Smith, supra note 171, at 19–21.  As John Baker explained, medieval chancellors 
did not regard themselves as administering a system of law different from the common law of England.  
They were making sure that justice was done in cases where shortcomings in the regular procedure, or 
human failings, rendered its attainment by due process unlikely.  They came not to destroy the law, but 
to fulfil it. 
BAKER, supra note 40, at 87. 
 179. See Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 12 n.62. 
 180. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 7, at 282–83. 
 182. See COHEN & DAYTON, supra note 98, at 5, 12–13 (emphasizing the importance of close “super-
vision of [arbitral] procedure”—over and above what was provided in the FAA—by a chamber of com-
merce, trade association, or other organization which has special experience”); Aragaki, supra note 13, 
at 1982–84. 
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A similar idea animates the Consumer and Employment Due Process Protocols, 
both of which were developed on the initiative of private organizations to improve 
the delivery of justice in arbitration.183 
                                                          
 183. NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL 
(1998); TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE PROCESS 
PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995). 
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